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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LESTER ROMERO,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)

Docket No. 970334-CA

\i

Priority No. 15

vs.
DICK HANSEN,
Defendant/Appellee.

]
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (k) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to set aside a

dismissal with prejudice, which was based upon a stipulation filed
by counsel for the parties, where Appellee/ Defendant had fully
performed the terms of settlement?

Reviewed under the abuse of

discretion standard, Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc.,
866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Did the trial court's decision to enforce the written

stipulation for dismissal with prejudice, entered into the record
by counsel for the parties, deprive Appellant of due process of
law? Reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, Goodmansen v.
Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.
This

is

an

appeal

from

a

post-judgment

order

denying

Plaintiff's motion to set aside a stipulation for dismissal with
prejudice.

Trial

in this matter was originally

scheduled

for

September 30, 1996, however, four days prior to that date, counsel
for the parties negotiated a settlement, and executed a stipulation
on behalf of their clients dismissing
prejudice. (Record 279)

all pending claims with

Upon being appraised by counsel that a

settlement had been achieved the Honorable Timothy Hansen struck
the trial. (Record 278)
On October 3, 1996, Plaintiff filed a pro-se motion requesting
that the court set aside the dismissal, claiming that his counsel
had acted improperly in settling the case. (Record 281)

Defendant

filed a memorandum in opposition (Record 284-291), and on or about
December

9,

1997, Judge Timothy

Hansen

issued

a minute

entry

denying Plaintifffs request to set aside the dismissal. (Record
294-295) . A final order denying Plaintiff's request was entered on
December 26, 1996. (Record 297-298)
Other than the motion to set aside the dismissal, no post
judgment motions were filed by either party.

2

B.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE;

1.

Plaintiff/Appellant brought this action, alleging that

Defendant/Appellee Hansen

improperly

sold a 1974 Marhmon Truck

which he had left at Mr. Hansen's business premises. (Record 1)
2.

On September 24, 1997 counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,

Lynn Heward, and counsel for Defendant/Appellee, John B. Anderson,
executed a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice of all claims
against Defendant/Appellee Dick Hansen, and filed the stipulation
with the trial court.
4.

(Record 279)

Defendant/Appellee

$2,000.00

as

consideration

Richard
for

the

Hansen

paid

dismissal

of

the

sum

of

the

action.

(Record 291)
5.

Plaintiff/Appellant

filed

a motion to set aside the

dismissal, alleging that his counsel had improperly settled the
action against Appellee.
6.

(Record 281)

Defendant/Appellee filed a memorandum seeking enforcement

of the stipulation and dismissal. (Record 284-291)
7.

In a minute entry signed on December 9, 1996, Judge

Timothy R. Hansen denied Plaintiff/Appellant!s motion. (Record 294295)
8.

A final order denying Plaintiff/Appellantfs motion to set

aside the dismissal with prejudice was entered on December 26,
1996. (Record 297-298)

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellantfs brief does not comply with the provisions of

1.

Rule 24(9) of the Utah R. App. P., as Appellant has failed to set
forth meaningful argument, supported by citations to the record and
relevant statutory and/or case law.

The court should decline to

consider the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
2.

The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to set

aside a dismissal with prejudice, which had been filed by the
parties1

counsel.

Appellantfs counsel was acting as his agent

when he accepted Appellee's settlement offer, and Appellant is
bound by the settlement under the doctrine of apparent authority.
3.

The trial court may enforce an oral settlement agreement,

and Appellant!s refusal to execute a written release of claims does
not preclude the trial court's enforcement of the agreement.
4.

Appellant was not denied due process by the trial court's

enforcement of the agreement.

Appellant has failed to identify

what due process right was implicated by the trial court's action,
and Appellant was not entitled to his "day in court"

because an

enforceable settlement agreement had been reached.
5.
Appellant

Appellee should recover his costs and attorney's fees.
has

failed

to

set

forth

any

argument, supported

by

citation to authority, in favor of his claim that the trial court
erred in enforcing the agreement.

Additionally, Appellant's claim

that he is not bound by the agreement because he did not sign the
written stipulation is contrary to established case law.
4

ARGUMENT
(I)
THE APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS
FAILED TO SET FORTH ANY ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
HIS POSITION, AS REQUIRED BY RULE 24(9) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Defendant/Appellee requests that the Court reject this appeal
in the first instance, because Plaintiff/Appellant has failed to
comply with Rule 24(9), Utah R. App. P., which requires that an
appellant's brief contain an argument, including "contentions and
reasons

with

respect

to

the

issues

presented

..."

and

lf

. . .

citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record
relied on."
Even a cursory review of the brief submitted by the appellant
demonstrates that he has failed to comply with these provisions.
The document not only lacks any citation to authority which would
support a decision to overturn the trial court's determination that
the parties entered

into a binding

stipulation

and

settlement

agreement, it utterly fails to set forth any coherent argument.
In fact, the only portion of the brief that even approaches
the level of argument is contained in two conclusory allegations
found in the appellant's statement of relevant facts. In the first
appellant claims that he "thinks that the law requires that I have
my day in Court, and that Attorney Lynn Heward and Attorney John B.
Anderson should not be able to set my rights just because I hired
Attorney
documents

Lynn
and

Heward
make

does

not give him

settlement

with
5

out

the
my

right
oral

to
or

prepair
witten

consent(sic)." (Appellant's Brief, p. 5 ) . In the second, Appellant
asserts that "Attorney Anderson sates a number of laws he sates his
possession, but no where does he state that there is a document
signed by me to settle this law suite. Ther for this settment
should be set for trial (sic)" (Appellantfs Brief, p.5.)
On at least two prior occasions, this court has made clear
that the failure to set forth a reasoned argument, supported by
citations to authority, is grounds for it to decline to address the
issues and assume the correctness of the judgment below. English v.
Standard Optical Co.,

814 P.2d 613, 618 (Utah App. 1991) and Evans

By and Through Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah App. 1992).
In Evans this court summarily refused to consider an issue which
was raised only by a short statement in the "issues" portion of the
brief, without further argument, ruling that because the appellant
had not:
"... sufficiently briefed or argued the issue
on appeal, we decline to address its merits.
Generally, this court will not manufacture a
legal argument for an appellant who fails to
brief or argue an issue." Id., at 469.
The situation addressed in Evans is nearly identical to that
presented here. Appellant has set forth two issues for the court f s
consideration: (1) whether he was deprived of due process of law,
and (2)

whether the stipulation entered into by his attorney was

binding without his signature on a settlement agreement: however,
he has made no argument in favor of his position, other than the
two conclusory allegations made in his statement of relevant facts.
6

Consistent with the ruling in Evans the Court should now refuse to
consider

all

issues

raised

in Appellant's

supported by adequate argument.

brief that are not

The Court should therefore deny

Appellant all relief requested in his brief.

(ID
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ENFORCING THE STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE EXECUTED AND FILED BY
COUNSEL FOR THE LITIGANTS.
The

decision

of

settlement agreement
standard.1

a

trial

court

is reviewed

to

summarily

enforce

a

under an abuse of discretion

Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d

581, 584 (Utah App. 1993).

In order to determine whether such an

abuse of discretion occurred, two questions should ordinarily be
addressed:

first, whether

the

court

abused

its discretion

in

finding that there was a binding agreement; and, second, whether
the non-performing party has a substantial excuse for its nonperformance. Zions Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P. 2d
478, 479 (Utah App. 1989).

1

While the appellate courts have recognized that "abuse of
discretion11 is a term which is incapable of precise definition, and
which encompasses a broad spectrum of possible review, in State v.
White, 880 P.2d 18, 20 (Utah App. 1994), this court stated that one
way to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion
is to ascertain whether its ruling "was beyond the limits of
reasonability".
This is the definition that makes most sense in
this case.
7

Here, Appellant has focused all of his attention on the first
prong of this test, alleging that there is no enforceable agreement
because he did not personally assent to the terms2 agreed to by
counsel,
document.

and

because he did

not execute

the

final

settlement

As will be explained in greater detail directly below,

neither of these allegations are supported by the facts in the
record or by relevant case law.

Accordingly, this court must find

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
set aside the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice.
(a)
ATTORNEY HEWARD WAS ACTING AS APPELLANT'S
AGENT IN SETTLING THE CASE AND STIPULATING
TO ITS DISMISSAL. APPELLANT IS BOUND BY
THE ACTS OF HIS AGENT.
In support of his request that this court overturn the trial
court's decision to enforce the stipulation filed by counsel in
this matter, Appellant asserts that his attorney, Mr. Lynn Heward,
was not entitled to accept the settlement proposed by Appellee, and
that Mr. Heward ! s acceptance of the offer and subsequent execution
of the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice did not create a
enforceable agreement. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5)

In making this

claim, Appellant ignores the basic principles of agency, which when
applied to the facts in the record demonstrate the correctness of
Judge Hansen's decision.

2

It must be emphasized that Appellant does not argue that no
agreement was reached, rather, his sole claim is that he is not
bound thereby.
8

In analyzing Appellant's claim, the court must first determine
whether Mr. Heward, when acting in his capacity as legal counsel,
was also acting as an agent for his client.

Well established case

and statutory authority confirm that this question may be answered
only

in the affirmative.

(See Goodmansen

v.

Liberty

Vending

Systems, Inc., supra at 584: a client may be bound by the acts of
its attorney under the doctrine of apparent authority.
Utah Code Ann., §78-51-32
authority

See also

(1953, as amended), an attorney has

to bind his client

in any step of the

litigation.)

Indeed in the brief he filed with this court, Appellant concedes
that his counsel was authorized to act as his agent and to conduct
settlement negotiations in connection with the lawsuit against Mr.
Hansen.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 5:

"Attorney Lynn Heward has the

rights to negotate (sic) my rights...11 )
With the question of status settled, the sole remaining issue
is whether a settlement negotiated by Mr. Heward is binding on
Appellant, if Mr. Heward accepted terms which were less than those
authorized by the Appellant3.
In addressing this issue in the trial court, Appellee argued
that

under

the

doctrine

of

apparent

authority

Mr.

Hewardfs

acceptance of his settlement offer, and the subsequent negotiation

3

Appellee does not conceded that there is any proof that
Attorney Heward exceeded his authority in accepting the settlement
of $2,00.00. Exhibits l-A and 1-C to Appellant's brief indicate
that Mr. Heward had discussed the terms of settlement with
Appellant, and understood that they were acceptable.
9

of the settlement check, bound Appellant to honor the terms of the
agreement. (Record 284-291)

This argument is well supported by

established case law. (See Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360
(Utah 1980) , where the Utah Supreme Court held that principals are
bound by the acts of their agents, when those acts are within the
scope of the authority apparently possessed by the agent.)
In Luddington v. Bodenvest, Ltd., 855 P.2d 204 (Utah 1993) the
Utah

Supreme

Court

held

that

the

following

elements

must

be

established in order to demonstrate that an agent is acting with
apparent authority:
11

(1) that the principal has manifested his consent
to the exercise of such authority ... (2) that the
third person knew of the facts and, acting in good
faith, had reason to believe and did actually believe that the agent possessed such authority; and,
(3) that the third person, relying on such appearance
of authority, has changed his position and will be
injured or suffer loss if the ... transaction executed by the agent does not bind the principal."
Id., 209.
Clearly the record demonstrates that Mr. Heward was clothed
with the authority to settle the litigation.4

First, as set forth

The question of whether an attorney has apparent authority
to bind his client may well be settled by dicta in Goodmansen v.
Liberty Vending Systems, Inc. , 866, P.2d 581, 584, (Utah App. 1993)
where this court noted, with approval, that the Appellants had
conceded that they were bound by the acts of their counsel, under
the doctrine of appendant authority.
See also Forsyth v.
Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358,360-361 (Utah 1980), in which the Utah
Supreme
Court upheld
a trial
court's
determination
that
representations by defendants attorney that the plaintiff could
adopt a payment schedule different from that set forth in a
contract for the sale of land were binding upon the defendant under
the doctrine of apparent authority.
10

above, Appellant has conceded that his attorney was authorized to
enter into negotiations with Appellee's counsel to resolve the
lawsuit.

Second, Appellee's counsel had no reason to believe that

Mr. Heward was not empowered to accept the offer of $2,000.00 in
complete settlement of all claims. In fact, Appellee's counsel was
ethically

prohibited

from

contacting

Appellant

determine whether the offer was acceptable.

directly

to

Thus, not only was

Appellee's reliance upon Mr. Heward's representations reasonable
under the circumstances, it was mandatory.

Finally, there is no

doubt that Appellee has changed his position in reliance upon the
representations of Mr. Heward.
and

fully

performed

his

He agreed to settle the lawsuit,

obligations

under

the

agreement

by

tendering payment to Appellant's agent. (Record 291)
The only conclusions that may be drawn from these facts are
that Mr. Heward was duly empowered to act on behalf of his client,
and that under the circumstances Appellee was justified in his
belief

that Mr. Heward

settlement.
make

authority

to

accept

his

offer of

Since Mr. Heward possessed the apparent authority to

reasonable

Appellee's

had

settlement

arrangements,

offer, as reflected

his

in the written

acceptance

of

stipulation

for

dismissal filed with the trial court (Record 279), is binding on
his client. Accordingly the trial court's refusal to set aside the
dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of its discretion.

11

(b)
ORAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS MAY BE ENFORCED,
APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO EXECUTE THE FINAL SETTLEMENT
DOCUMENT DOES NOT RENDER THE AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE.
Appellant also asks this court to overturn the trial court's
decision to honor the stipulation for dismissal, because he did not
sign any document manifesting his intent to settle the lawsuit.
(Appellantfs Brief, p. 5, paragraph 10.)

Essentially Appellant

appears to claim that in order for a settlement to be binding there
must be a written agreement, and he must have personally executed
that document.

This claim has no basis in law.

The question of whether a written document, signed by the
parties to the litigation, is required to create an enforceable
settlement agreement was recently addressed by this court in John
Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1994).
In that

case

counsel

for Defendant proposed

that

the

pending

litigation be settled by a mutual dismissal of all claims with
prejudice.

Plaintiff's counsel accepted on behalf of his client,

and a written memorialization of their agreement was prepared and
presented to Defendant for its signature.

Defendant, however,

refused to sign the written agreement, claiming that the settlement
proposed by
conditions

its counsel did not contain all of the terms and
it

desired.

Plaintiff

then

moved

to

enforce

the

agreement, and Defendant opposed on the grounds that it had not
signed the settlement document.
the

terms

of

settlement

The trial court determined that

offered
12

by

Defendant's

counsel

were

sufficiently

clear, and that the acceptance of those terms by

Plaintiff's counsel created an enforceable agreement.
agreed

with

the

trial

court's

analysis,

and

This court

stated

that

the

agreement was enforceable "despite the fact that it had not been
reduced to writing and signed by the parties." Id., at 887.
The issues and facts considered in John Deere are directly on
point with those presented to the court by this appeal, and its
holding should be dispositive of Appellant's request for relief.
As in Deere, a clear offer of compromise was suggested by counsel
for Appellee; i.e., the payment of $2,000.00

in return

for a

dismissal of all claims; and counsel for Appellant accepted the
offer.

Only after the negotiations were complete; the proposed

compromise accepted; payment made; and, a written stipulation for
dismissal filed with the court, pursuant to Rule 4-504(8) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration; did Appellant come forth and
state that his counsel had not obtained the settlement he desired.
Again,

as

settlement

in

the

Deere

case, Appellant

agreement, and

seeks to rely

justification to set aside the agreement.

refused

to

sign

upon that refusal

the
as

The holding in Deere,

however, makes clear that Appellant's claim that he is not bound by
the

settlement,

merely

because

he

did

not

sign

memorialization of the agreement, is without basis.

a

written

This court

should follow its holding in Deere and uphold the trial court's
decision to enforce the parties' stipulation for dismissal.

13

(Ill)

THE TRIAL COURT»S DECISION TO ENFORCE THE
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL DID NOT DEPRIVE
APPELLANT OF ANY DUE PROCESS RIGHT,
Appellant also alleges that the decision of the trial court to
enforce the stipulation for dismissal, which was executed and filed
by the parties1 counsel pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code
Jud. Admin,, deprived him of due process of law.5 Appellant has
failed to identify the right that was infringed upon by the trial
court's decision, however it appears that he believes that he has
an absolute right to present his case at trial.

This position is

entirely without merit.
It is indisputable that a trial court may summarily enforce a
settlement agreement reached by the parties to litigation, and so
long as it does not abuse its discretion in doing so its decision
will be upheld on appeal.

John Deere, supra, at 883.

Naturally,

the enforcement of a settlement agreement necessarily precludes the
granting of a trial, and therefore Appellant's claim of an absolute
right to trial is shown the be without any basis whatsoever.

5

Appellant has failed to set forth any argument in favor of
his position, and, as argued in Section I, above, this alone should
lead the court to deny his request for relief. The failure to
specify the precise deprivation of due process also makes it
difficult to determine which level of review the court should
utilize in addressing Appellant's claim. As set forth in the body
of this brief, the claim that Appellant was denied his nday in
court11 is fundamentally no different than his claim that the trial
court erred in enforcing the stipulation reached by counsel.
Therefore Appellee believes that the issue should be addressed
under the same level of review; the abuse of discretion standard.
14

As

explained

above,

discretion in this case.

the

trial

court

did

not

abuse

its

Rather it determined that a binding

agreement was reached by the parties, and it properly decided to
enforce that agreement.

Appellant's request for relief should be

denied.
(IV)
APPELLANT HAS BROUGHT THIS APPEAL WITHOUT
FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS. APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED
ITS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS SANCTIONS.
Rule 33 of the Utah R. App. P., provides that this court may
award costs and attorney's fees as sanctions in the event that a
party files a frivolous appeal, which is defined as "one which is
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based
on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing
law.11

Appellee would request that the court impose such sanctions

against Appellant for violating the provisions of this rule.
In Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah
App. 1992), this court considered the question of sanctions under
Rule

33, and

found

that

it was

proper

to

assess

attorney's fees where the appellant had offered
explanation11 to support its theory on appeal.
here.

Appellant has utterly

costs

and

"absolutely no

Such is the case

failed to set out any reason or

argument in favor of his position that the trial court erred in
upholding the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice, or in favor
of his claim that the trial court1s decision denied him due process
of law.
15

Additionally, Appellant's only attempt at argument; i.e., the
conclusory allegation that he was not bound by the stipulation
because he did not sign a formal release; is contrary to well
established law.

Had he made even the briefest review of

the case and statutory authority on this issue, he would have found
that this court has repeatedly enforced oral settlement agreements,
and that it has expressly ruled that a written memorialization,
signed by the parties to the litigation, is not necessary to form
a binding

contract

for settlement.

(See Goodmansen v.

Liberty

Vending Systems, Inc., supra, at 581; John Deere Co. , v. A & H
Equipment, Inc., supra, at 887; and, Rule 4-504 Utah Code Jud.
Admin.)
In light of the obvious deficiencies in Appellant's brief, and
in

light

of

the

fact

that

Appellantfs

position

is

directly

contradicted by well established authority, Appellee would pray
that this court find that Appellant has filed a frivolous appeal,
and award him his costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending
this action.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily
enforcing the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice filed by the
parties1

counsel

in

this

matter.

Mr.

Heward

was

acting

as

Appellant's agent when he negotiated and accepted the settlement
proposed by Appellee, and Appellant is bound by this acceptance
under

the doctrine

of

apparent
16

authority,

notwithstanding

his

subsequent

refusal

to

execute

the

document

memorializing

the

agreement.

Appellant has failed to set forth any argument to the

contrary, and for this reason alone the Court of Appeals should
uphold the decision of the trial court.
This court should also sanction Appellant for filing an appeal
that is unsupported by argument and which

is not warranted by

existing law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

<^k

day of June, 1997.

*£*//;
&IAM%4&
^^Anderson

John
Michael Wright
Attorneys for DeTehdant/Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \3&~~ day of fjj^^f^
, 1997,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoiraBrief of Appellee
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Lester Romeyy; Pro Se, 6270 South
2005 West, West Jordan, Utah 84084.

/^•^•. xLfc.

17

